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Abstract
A voting situation, in which voters are asked to rank all candidates pair by pair, induces a
tournament and a weighted tournament, in which the strength of the majority matters. Each of
these two tournaments induces in turn a two-player zero-sum game for which different solution
concepts can be found in the literature. Four social choice correspondences for voting situations
based exclusively on the simple majority relation, and called C1, correspond to four different
solution concepts for the game induced by the corresponding tournament. They are the top cycle,
the uncovered set, the minimal covering set, and the bipartisan set. Taking the same solution
concepts for the game induced by the corresponding weighted tournament instead of the
tournament and working backward from these solution concepts to the solutions for the
corresponding weighted tournament and then to the voting situation, we obtain the C2 counterparts
of these correspondences, i.e. correspondences that require the size of the majorities to operate.We
also perform a set-theoretical comparison between the four C1 correspondences, their four C2
counterparts and three other C2 correspondences, namely the Kemeny, the Kramer–Simpson, and
the Borda rules. Given two subsets selected by two correspondences, we say whether it always
belongs to, always intersects or may not intersect the other one. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science B.V.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Tournaments
A tournament is a competition in which every contestant meets every other contestant
2 in turn. In some tournaments, contestants may meet each other more than once, say q
times. In each of the q encounters, one of the opponents beats the other one or they tie.
We call them q-weighted tournaments or simply weighted tournaments, a term that we
may trace back to Moulin (1988). More generally, a (weak) tournament is deﬁned by a
complete binary relation on a ﬁnite set. A (weak) weighted tournament is deﬁned by a
non-negative number q and a list of numbers or weights n(x,y), such that n(x,y)1
n(y,x)5q for all pairs (x,y) of different contestants. The number n(x,y) is the share of q
that contestant x gets when opposed to y. Weighted tournaments may be seen as
tournaments with additional information as to how strong each contestant is with respect
to every other contestant.
Tournaments may arise in many contexts other than sports. Our main interest is in
voting situations where voters are asked to rank all candidates pair by pair as imagined
by Condorcet (1785) or, equivalently, to furnish their complete preference over the set
of all candidates. In this article, we deﬁne a (voting) situation as a set of candidates
together with a list of preferences over this set. A situation induces a q-weighted
tournament on the set of candidates, where q is the number of voters and n(x,y)i st h e
number of voters ranking x ahead of y. By retaining only the majority relation, i.e.
whether n(x,y)$n(y,x), the opposite or both, we get an unweighted tournament.
´ In Guenoche et al. (1994), one ﬁnds 0-weighted tournaments where n(x,y) represents
the difference between the yield of rapeseed varieties x and y in a given territory.
´ Guenoche (1995) applies similar techniques to marketing. He obtains a weighted
tournament by comparing nine brands of computers on a pairwise basis according to a
poll of consumers. This is not very different from voting.
1.2. Social choice correspondences
A question that arises naturally in voting situations and thus in tournaments is how to
choose a winner. This question has been the subject of many articles and books since the
celebrated controversy between Borda (1784) and Condorcet (1785). Laslier (1997)
provides an illuminating synthesis of these various contributions. In the language of the
theory of social choice, a rule that selects a set of candidates in any voting situation is
called a social choice correspondence. Condorcet advocated selecting a contestant that
defeats all others more than half of the time in the q encounters. Such a candidate is
called a Condorcet winner. However, Condorcet was well aware that there might be a
cycle in the majority relation preventing the existence of a Condorcet winner.When this
happens, some other rule must be called to the rescue to break these cycles or to select
some subset of contestants. A social choice correspondence that selects exclusively the
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Condorcet winner whenever it exists is called a Condorcet consistent social choice
correspondence. Many of the social choice correspondences that have been proposed in
the literature, including most of those that will be considered here, are of this sort. The
above concepts can be transposed to tournaments where the social choice corre-
spondences become solutions.
Following Fishburn (1977), we classify social choice correspondences on the basis of
their data requirements. A social choice correspondence belongs to the class C1i fi ti s
based exclusively on the simple majority relation, i.e. on the outcomes of all pairwise
majority comparisons. The C2 social choice correspondences require more data, namely
the size of the majorities or the numbers n(x,y). Social choice correspondences requiring
more data form the class C3. We could deﬁne another class contained in C2 and
containing C1, say the class C1.5, consisting of social choice correspondences that use
the numbers n(x,y)2n(y,x) instead of the separate numbers n(x,y) and n(y,x). However,
all C2 social choice correspondences that have been considered in the literature and
those that we shall propose in this article use only the numbers n(x,y)2n(y,x). Thus
Fishburn might have deﬁned the class C2 as consisting of all correspondences that are
based on the numbers n(x,y)2n(y,x). This is the deﬁnition that we shall adopt here. The
numbers n(x,y)2n(y,x) deﬁne a 0-weighted tournament, which can be considered as a
canonical form of weighted tournaments.
Four of the most studied C1 social choice correspondences are: Schwartz’s (1972) top
cycle (TC), Fishburn’s (1977) and Miller’s (1980) uncovered set (UC), Dutta’s (1988)
minimal covering set (MC) and Laffond et al.’s (1993) bipartisan set (BP). Laffond et al.
(1995) compare these C1 choice correspondences from a set-theoretical point of view.
Given a pair of social choice correspondences, and more precisely the choice sets of
these correspondences, they determine which of the following three propositions holds:
· One always contains the other.
· They always intersect but, in some situations, none of them contains the other one.
· In some situations, they have an empty intersection.
Moulin (1986) also discusses some of these relations.
Laffond et al. (1994) introduce the plurality (weighted) bipartisan set (BP ). In an w
article contemporary with ours, Dutta and Laslier (1999) introduce the C2 counterparts
of the weighted uncovered set (UC ) and the weighted minimal covering set (MC ). Our ww
purpose in this article is twofold. First we ﬁll the gap between C1 and C2 corre-
spondences by introducing the weighted top cycle (TC ). Our second objective is to w
perform the set-theoretical comparisons, as in Laffond et al. (1995), between the four C1
correspondences, their four C2 counterparts and three other C2 correspondences
frequently encountered in the literature, namely the Kemeny Ke , the Kramer–Simpson sd
SK and the Borda Bor rules. Some of these comparisons are borrowed from the sd s d
existing literature. The other ones, and especially those involving the new C2 concepts,
have to be done from scratch. Our ﬁndings are summarized in Table 2 at the beginning
of Section 3.
There is no obvious way of deﬁning the weighted top cycle (TC ) directly in the w
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situation induces a tournament and a 0-weighted tournament. Each of these two
tournaments induces in turn a two-player zero-sum game for which different solution
concepts can be found in the literature. It turns out that the four C1 social choice
correspondences mentioned above correspond to four different solution concepts for the
game induced by the corresponding tournament. Taking the same solution concepts for
the game induced by the corresponding 0-weighted tournament instead of the tourna-
ment and working backward from these solution concepts to the solutions for the
corresponding 0-weighted tournament and then to the voting situation yields the
corresponding C2 social choice correspondences. This is how the weighted bipartisan set
(BP ) is deﬁned by Laffond et al. (1994). As Dutta and Laslier (1999), we deﬁne the w
weighted uncovered set (UC ) and the weighted minimal covering set (MC ) directly in ww
the context of voting situations but in a way that preserves the correspondence with the
solution concepts for the plurality game induced by the corresponding 0-weighted
tournament. Finally, the weighted top cycle (TC ) is deﬁned as the mixed saddle of the w
plurality game induced by the corresponding 0-weighted tournament.
1.3. Highlights of the results
Concerning the relations between TC, UC, MC, BP and their weighted counterparts
TC , UC , MC , BP , we show that UC#UC and MC #MC . We know from www w w w
Laffond et al. (1994) that possibly BP >BP 55. As for the top cycles, we obtain w
instead that TC #TC, i.e. the weighted top cycle is a reﬁnement of the top cycle. It is w
well known that BP #MC #UC#TC. In the weighted case the relations are more
intricate. It is easy to see that BP #UC and MC #UC . We show that BP #TC ww ww w w
and BP #MC and also that none of TC and MC is a superset of the other. ww w w
Our main results concerning the Kemeny rule are: Ke is a subset of TC and UC ; w
otherwise this set may have an empty intersection with any of the six remaining sets and
notably with UC and TC . As for the Kramer–Simpson rule, we prove that SK intersects w
MC and therefore UC . Otherwise, SK may have an empty intersection with any of the ww
six remaining sets and notably with the top cycle. Finally, the set of Borda winners Bor
may have an empty intersection with all other sets except with UC . Actually, Bor is a w
subset of UC . w
In this article, we restrict ourselves to (asymmetric) tournaments in which no ties are
allowed either in the individual encounters or in the split of the victories between
contestants. In other words, we assume that the binary relation deﬁning an unweighted
tournament is asymmetric and that the numbers n(x,y) deﬁning a q-weighted tournament
satisfy n(x,y)±n(y,x). Furthermore, when discussing the solutions BP and BP ,w e w
restrict ourselves to weighted tournaments for which the numbers n(x,y) are odd
integers.
1.4. Related literature
A more general class of tournaments consists of weak weighted tournaments. Dutta
and Laslier (1999) consider the class of weak 0-weighted tournaments, which they call
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uniqueness of the minimal covering set for these comparison functions. Each comparison
function induces a two-player zero-sum symmetric game as in this article. This game has
not necessarily a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. They consider the largest
possible support of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, which they call the Essential
set of the comparison function. They extend our Propositions 3 (UC#UC ), 6 w
(MC #MC ), and 7 (BP #MC ) to comparison functions, replacing BP with their ww w w
essential set in the latter. Note, however, that the interpretation of MC in terms of w
saddles does not necessarily extend to all comparison functions.
The 0-weighted tournaments for which n(x,y)[h21,0,1j form a special class of
comparison functions, called weak tournaments by Peris and Subiza (1999). They also
prove, among other results, the uniqueness of the minimal covering set for weak
tournaments. Duggan and Le Breton (1997b) look at the different saddles of the weak
tournament game. They prove that the essential set is a subset of the (unique) mixed
saddle and examine the relations among the different saddles.
1.5. Contents
In Section 2, we present the deﬁnitions concerning tournaments and voting situations,
some non-standard game-theoretical notions, and the 11 solutions for tournaments or
weighted tournaments discussed and compared in this article. In Section 3, we proceed
to the set-theoretical comparison of these 11 solutions. Finally, we conclude in Section 4
with some lessons that can be drawn from these comparisons.
2. Deﬁnitions
2.1. Tournaments, weighted tournaments and situations
A tournament is a pair (X,T) where X is a ﬁnite set and T is an asymmetric and
2 2 ˆ complete binary relation over X. Let X ;h(x,y)[X : x ±yj. Thus, in a tournament,
2 ˆ ;(x,y)[X , we have either xTy or yTx, where xTy may be interpreted as: x beats y.
Let q be a non-negative real number. A q-weighted tournament is a pair (X,N) where
X is a ﬁnite set and N is a matrix N ;[n(x,y)] such that n(x,y)1n(y,x)5q x,y[X 2 2 ˆ ;(x,y)[X and n(x,y)±n(y,x) ;(x,y)[X . This implies that n(x,x)5q/2 ;x [X.A
NN q-weighted tournament (X,N) induces the tournament (X,T ) where T is deﬁned by:
2 N ˆ ;(x,y)[X : xT y if and only if n(x,y).n(y,x). Thus a q-weighted tournament may be
seen as a tournament with additional information as to how strong x is with respect to y.
In this article, we focus on 0-weighted tournaments. A q-weighted tournament (X,N)
NN induces the 0-weighted tournament (X,M ) where the elements of M are deﬁned by
N m (x,y);n(x,y)2n(y,x)52n(x,y)2q.
Conversely, given any q $0, a 0-weighted tournament (X,M) induces the q-weighted
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m(x,y)1q M ]]] n (x,y); . 2
NM MN Clearly, N 5N and M 5M. For any q $0, there is thus a one-to-one corre-
spondence between 0-weighted tournaments and q-weighted tournaments. A tournament
2 ˆ (X,T) may be seen as a 0-weighted tournament (X,M) where, ;(x,y)[X , m(x,y)[
h21,1j.
Let 7 be the set of all tournaments over all ﬁnite sets of alternatives. A solution for 7
is a multivalued mapping S : 7 ®X that assigns a nonempty choice set S (X,T)#X to 77
each tournament (X,T). Similarly, if we let 1 be the set of weighted tournaments, a
solution for 1 is a multivalued mapping S : 1 ®X that assigns a nonempty choice set 1
S (X,N)#X to every weighted tournament (X,N). A solution S is Condorcet consistent 1 1
if, for each q-weighted tournament (X,N), we have S (X,N)5hxj whenever n(x,y).q/2 1
for all y [X, y ±x. Alternative x is then called the Condorcet winner.
Consider a solution S for the subset } of 0-weighted tournaments. Given the }
one-to-one correspondence between 0-weighted tournaments and q-weighted tourna-
ments for a particular q, we can extend the solution S for } to all other weighted
N tournaments in 1 by S(X,N);S(X,M ). The contrary is not possible. A solution for 1
may associate two different subsets of X to two different N even if the latter induces the
same M.
To show that this abstract framework covers voting, we deﬁne a (voting) situation as a
pair (X,P) where X is a ﬁnite set of alternatives and P is a ﬁnite list (P ,P ,..., P ,...) 12 i
of linear orders on X. Their number is noted [P. These linear orders may be interpreted
as the preferences of [P individuals or voters. Since only preferences matter, we do not
introduce voters explicitly in the model. Given a subset Y #X, PuY represents the
restriction of P to Y. Given a proﬁle P, we deﬁne
2 ˆ ;(x,y)[X : n (x,y);[hP [P : xP yj, Pi i
;x [X : n (x,x);[P/2, P
N ;[n (x,y)] . PP x ,y[X
Let V be the set of all possible situations. A social choice correspondence is a
multi-valued mapping G : V ®X that associates a non-empty choice set G(X,P)#X to
every situation (X,P). As for tournaments, a social choice correspondence is Condorcet
consistent if, for each situation (X,P), we have G(X,P)5hxj whenever n(x,y).[P/2 for
all y [X, y ±x.We concentrate on the subclass $ ,V of situations such that the matrix
NN PP N deﬁnes a [P-weighted tournament. We write M for M and T for T .( X,T ), PP P P
(X,N ) and (X,M ) are, respectively, the tournament, the [P-weighted tournament, and PP
the 0-weighted tournament induced by proﬁle P on X.
The relation from $ to 7 deﬁned by T ;T is onto. Indeed, McGarvey (1953) shows P
that for any tournament (X,T), there exists a proﬁle P such that T 5T . A similar result P
by Debord (1987) asserts that for any anti-symmetric matrix M, there exists a proﬁle P
such that M 5M if and only if all the off-diagonal entries of M have the same parity. PP. De Donder et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 85–109 91
Thus the relation from $ deﬁned by M ;M is not onto the whole set }. Following P
Barthelemy et al. (1989), we call voting tournaments the 0-weighted tournaments (X,M)
such that all the off-diagonal entries of M have the same parity. The relation from $ to
3 1 is more intricate and will not be discussed here.
A social choice correspondence G is C1 if, for all pairs of situations (X,P) and (X,P9),
T 5T implies G(X,P)5G(X,P9). A social choice correspondence G is C2i fi ti sn o t PP 9
C1 and if for all pairs of situations (X,P) and (X,P9), M 5M implies G(X,P)5 PP 9
G(X,P9). Put differently, a social choice correspondence G is C1 if there exists a solution
S for 7 such that for all situations (X,P), G(X,P)5S (X,T ). Similarly, a social choice 7 7 P
correspondence G is C2i fi ti sn o tC1 and if there exists a solution S for } such that for
all situations (X,P), G(X,P)5S (X,M ). As explained in the Introduction, Fishburn } P
(1977), to whom one owes this classiﬁcation, deﬁnes the C2 class with respect to NP
instead of M . We justiﬁed our use of the above deﬁnition in the Introduction. P
It has just been seen that the choice sets of C1 and C2 social choice correspondences
are actually the choice sets of solutions for, respectively, the tournaments and 0-
weighted tournaments induced by the voting situations.We shall go one step further and
4 work with zero-sum two-person games that can be deﬁned from these tournaments. To
prepare for this task, we review in the next subsection some non-standard solution
concepts for zero-sum two-person games.
2.2. Solutions for two-player zero-sum games
This subsection presents solution concepts for two-player zero-sum games. It is based
5 on Shapley (1964) and Duggan and Le Breton (1997a). .
Let G ;(X ,X ,u) be a ﬁnite two-player zero-sum game where X and X are the sets 12 1 2
of pure strategies of players 1 and 2, respectively, and u : X 3X ®R is the payoff 12
function of player 1. The payoff function of player 2 is 2u. A game G is symmetric if
X 5X and u(x,y)1u(y,x)50 for all (x,y)[X 3X . For any subset A #X , D(A ) 12 12 ii i
denotes the set of probability distributions over A . Given some vector of probability i
p [D(A ), the support of p is the set Supp(p);hx [ A : p(x).0j. ii
Let A be a subset of strategies for player 2. The following notions of dominance are 2
classical.
· x is strictly dominated by y relative to A if u(y ,z ).u(x ,z ) for all z [ A . 11 2 1 2 1 2 2 2
· x is weakly dominated by y relative to A if u(y ,z )$u(x ,z ) for all z [ A with 11 2 1 2 1 2 2 2
a strict inequality for at least one z [ A . 22
· x is strictly dominated in the mixed sense by p [D(X ) relative to A if: 11 1 2
O p (y )u(y ,z ).u(x ,z ) for all z [ A . 1 1 12 12 2 2
y [X 11
3This is the well-known binary stochastic choice problem. See Fishburn (1992) for a description of the state of
the art on the latter.
4Laffond et al. (1994) give an interpretation of these games as Downsian games in Political Science.
5We restrict ourselves to two-player zero-sum games but these notions can be extended to any ﬁnite n-player
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The same three dominance relations are deﬁned similarly for player 2. The following
terminology is borrowed from Shapley (1964) and Duggan and Le Breton (1997a).
Deﬁnition 1. A Generalized Saddle Point (GSP) for a game G is a product A 3 A # 12
X 3X such that: 12
;x [ ⁄ A : 'y [ A such that x is strictly dominated by y relative to A , 1111 1 1 2
;x [ ⁄ A : 'y [ A such that x is strictly dominated by y relative to A . 2222 2 2 1
A GSP that does not contain other GSP is a Saddle.
Deﬁnition 2. A Weak Generalized Saddle Point (WGSP) for a game G is a product
A 3 A #X 3X such that: 12 12
;x [ ⁄ A : 'y [ A such that x is weakly dominated by y relative to A , 1111 1 1 2
;x [ ⁄ A : 'y [ A such that x is weakly dominated by y relative to A . 2222 2 2 1
A WGSP that does not contain other WGSP is a Weak Saddle.
Deﬁnition 3. A Mixed Generalized Saddle Point (MGSP) for a game G is a product
A 3 A #X 3X such that: 12 12
;x [ ⁄ A : 'p [D(A ) 11 1 1
such that x is strictly dominated in the mixed sense by p relative to A , 11 2
;x [ ⁄ A : 'p [D(A ) 22 2 2
such that x is strictly dominated in the mixed sense by p relative to A . 22 1
A MGSP that does not contain other MGSP is a Mixed Saddle.
Since X and X are assumed to be ﬁnite, saddles, weak saddles, and mixed saddles 12
exist. Shapley (1964) proves that there exists a unique saddle and Duggan and Le Breton
(1997a) prove that there is a unique mixed saddle. A two-player zero-sum game may
have several weak saddles. However, Duggan and Le Breton (1996) prove that if G is
symmetric and u(x,y)±0 for all x ±y, then there is a unique weak saddle. Moreover, if
G is symmetric, the saddle, the weak saddle (if unique) and the mixed saddle are
symmetric, i.e. of the form A3 A. In this case, we shall refer to A as the saddle, weak
saddle or mixed saddle.
Deﬁnition 4. An equilibrium in mixed strategies for a game G is a pair of probability
distributions p [D(X ) and p [D(X ) that satisfy the following inequalities: 11 22P. De Donder et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 85–109 93
OO p (x )p (x )u(x ,x )$OO q (x )p (x )u(x ,x ), ;q [D(X ), 1122 12 1122 12 1 1
x [Xx[Xx [Xx[X 11 22 11 22
OO p (x )p (x )u(x ,x )#OO p (x )q (x )u(x ,x ), ;q [D(X ). 1122 12 1122 12 2 2
x [Xx[Xx [Xx[X 11 22 11 22
The following result, known as the Minmax Theorem, provides a characterization of
equilibria in mixed strategies. See Owen (1982) for a proof.
Lemma 1. Let q ;min max oop (x )p (x )u(x ,x ). A pair p [D(X ) p [D(X ) x [Xx [X 1122 12 22 11 1 1 2 2
(p ,p )[D(X )3D(X ) is an equilibrium in mixed strategies if and only if: 12 1 2
O p (x)u(x,y)$q, ;y [X , 12
x[X1
O p (y)u(x,y)#q, ;x [X . 21
y[X2
The scalar q in the above lemma is the value of the game.I fG is symmetric then
q 50. Laffond et al. (1997) prove that if G is symmetric and u(x,y) is an odd integer for
all x ±y, then G has a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
2.3. Tournament games and C1 choice correspondences
A tournament (X,T) induces a symmetric two-player zero-sum game (X,X,u ) where: T
1, if xTy,
21, if yTx, u (x,y); T 50, if x 5y.
We call this game the tournament game induced by (X,T). The relation between
tournaments and tournament games is clearly one-to-one. Since a tournament game is
symmetric and u (x,y) is an odd integer for all x ±y, we know that it has a unique T
saddle, a unique weak saddle, a unique mixed saddle, and a unique equilibrium in mixed
strategies. Duggan and Le Breton (1997b) point out that if T has no Condorcet winner,
then the saddle of the tournament game consists of the whole set X, which is not very
discriminating. We shall therefore focus on the other two saddles.
Next, we introduce three C1 solution concepts for tournaments. As we shall see, each
has a connection with a solution of the corresponding tournament game. The ﬁrst of
these solutions is Schwartz’s (1972) top cycle.
Deﬁnition 5. The top cycle TC(X,T) of a tournament (X,T) is the set of all outcomes that
beat directly or indirectly any other outcome in X:
a [X : ;b [X/haj, 'a ,a ,..., a [X 12 k TC(X,T); . HJ such that a 5aT aT...Ta 5b 12 k94 P. De Donder et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 85–109
Duggan and Le Breton (1997b) prove that the mixed saddle of the tournament game
induced by (X,T) is the top cycle of (X,T).
Fishburn (1977) and Miller (1980) propose another tournament solution called the
uncovered set. They ﬁrst deﬁne the covering relation C relative to a subset Y #X as:
;x,y [X, xC(T)y relative to Y #X if xTy and if yTw ÞxTw, ;w [Y.
Deﬁnition 6. The uncovered set UC(X,T) of a tournament (X,T) is the set of maximal
elements of the covering relation C(T) relative to X:
UC(X,T);ha [X : ' ⁄ b [X : bC(T)a relative to Xj.
The covering relation is also the transposition, to tournaments, of the weak dominance
relation of the corresponding tournament game. Thus, the uncovered set of a tournament
(X,T) is also the set of weakly undominated strategies (relative to X) in the corre-
sponding tournament game (X,X,u ). T
0 We can reﬁne this solution concept by iteration. Let UC (X,T);X and, for all
integers t ^1, let:
tt 21 t21 UC (X,T);UC(UC (X,T), PuUC (X,T)).
] k11 k Let k be the smallest integer such that UC (X,T)5UC (X,T) and let UC(X,T);
] k UC (X,T). Clearly, UC(X,T)#UC(X,T) for any tournament.
Dutta (1988) proposes another solution concept, the minimal covering set, also based
on the covering relation C(T). First, he deﬁnes a covering set of a tournament (X,T)a sa
subset A#X satisfying:
UC(X,TuA)5 A and ;b [ ⁄ A : b [ ⁄ UC(X,TuA<hbj).
We can reformulate these two conditions as stability conditions. The ﬁrst is an
internal stability condition:
;x,y [ A, not xC(T)y relative to A and not yC(T)x relative to A,
i.e. no option in A is covered relative to A. The second is an external stability condition:
;b [ ⁄ A, 'y [ A : yC(T)b relative to A<hbj.
]
It is easy to see that UC(X,T) is a covering set.We also deﬁne a weak covering set of
a tournament (X,T) as a subset A#X such that ;x [ ⁄ A, 'y [ A : yC(T)x on A<hxj.A
weak covering set satisﬁes external stability but not necessarily internal stability.
Clearly, a weak covering set is a WGSP of the corresponding tournament game.
Next, Dutta deﬁnes a minimal covering set of a tournament (X,T) as a covering set of
]
(X,T) that does not contain other covering sets of (X,T). Since UC(X,T) is a covering set
and since X is ﬁnite, minimal covering sets do exist. Dutta proves that there is in fact a
unique minimal covering set that will be denoted MC(X,T). Thus, we have the following
deﬁnition.P. De Donder et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 85–109 95
Deﬁnition 7. The minimal covering set MC(X,T) of a tournament (X,T) is the unique
covering set of (X,T) that does not contain other covering sets of (X,T).
Duggan and Le Breton (1996) show that MC(X,T) is the weak saddle of the
tournament game induced by (X,T). The last C1 solution to be introduced in this
subsection is due to Laffond et al. (1993). It is transposed from the solution of the
corresponding tournament game.
Deﬁnition 8. The Bipartisan set of a tournament (X,T) is the support BP(X,T) of the
unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies of the tournament game (X,X,u ) induced T
by this tournament.
2.4. Plurality games and C2 choice correspondences
As for tournaments, a 0-weighted tournament (X,M) induces a symmetric two-player
zero-sum game (X,X,u ), where M
u (x,y);m(x,y) for all x,y [X. M
We call this game the plurality game induced by (X,M). The relation between
0-weighted tournaments and plurality games is clearly one-to-one. The plurality game
has a unique saddle and, in contrast to the tournament game, the saddle may be a proper
subset of X.We shall not discuss this set in this article, to keep a symmetric treatment of
the two kinds of games.
The result concerning the mixed saddle of the tournament game suggests the
following deﬁnition, for which there is no obvious intuition.
Deﬁnition 9. The weighted top cycle TC (X,M) of a 0-weighted tournament (X,M) is the w
mixed saddle of the plurality game induced by (X,M).
We now transpose the covering relation of the previous subsection to 0-weighted
tournaments. We deﬁne the weighted covering relation C (M) relative to a subset Y #X w
as follows:
;x,y [X, xC (M)y relative to Y #X if m(x,y).0 and if m(x,z)$m(y,z), ;z [Y. w
Deﬁnition 10. The weighted uncovered set UC (X,M) of a 0-weighted tournament w
(X,M) is the set of maximal elements of the weighted covering relation C (M) relative to w
X:
UC (X,M);ha [X : ' ⁄ b [X : bC (M)a relative to Xj. ww
The weighted covering relation is also the transposition, to 0-weighted tournaments,
of the weak dominance relation of the corresponding plurality game. Thus, the weighted
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of weakly undominated strategies (relative to X) in the corresponding plurality game
(X,X,u ). M
12 We can also deﬁne the iterates of this set, namely UC (X,M), UC (X,M), etc., as we ww ]
did for UC(X,T). The limit UC (X,M) of this series is the set of strategies that remain w
after iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
Next, we use the weighted covering relation C to introduce the weighted equivalent w
of the minimal covering set. A weighted covering set of a 0-weighted tournament (X,M)
is a subset A#X satisfying:
UC (X,MuA)5 A and ;x [ ⁄ A : x [ ⁄ UC (X,MuA<hxj). ww
]
Note that UC (X,M) is a weighted covering set. We also deﬁne a weak weighted w
covering set of a 0-weighted tournament (X,M) as a subset A#X such that ;x [ ⁄ A,
'y [ A : yC (M)x relative to A<hxj. Clearly, a weak weighted covering set of (X,M)i s w
a WGSP of the plurality game induced by (X,M). The following simple lemma
establishes the relation between weak weighted covering sets and weak covering sets.
Lemma 2. If A is a weak weighted covering set of a 0-weighted tournament (X,M), then
M A is also a weak covering set of the tournament (X,T ).
Proof. Let A be a weak weighted covering set of a 0-weighted tournament and take any
M x [ ⁄ A. By deﬁnition, 'y [ A : m(y,z)$m(x,z), ;z [ A<hxj. Thus, xT z Þm(x,z).
MM 0Þm(y,z).0Þ yT z. This means that yC(T )x relative to A<hxj. h
A minimal weighted covering set of a 0-weighted tournament (X,M) is a weighted
]
covering set that does not contain other covering sets of (X,M). Since UC (X,M)i sa w
weighted covering set and since X is ﬁnite, minimal weighted covering sets do exist. In
order to justify the next deﬁnition, we need to show the following result.
Lemma 3. A minimal (with respect to inclusion) weak covering set of a tournament is
also a minimal covering set of the same tournament. Similarly, a minimal weak
weighted covering set of a 0-weighted tournament is also a minimal weighted covering
set of the same 0-weighted tournament.
Proof. Let A be a minimal weak covering set of a tournament. By deﬁnition, A satisﬁes
the external stability condition. We claim that it also satisﬁes the internal stability
condition. Suppose not, i.e. 'x,y [ A : xCy relative to A. Since C is transitive, y can be
removed from A without sacriﬁcing external stability, contradicting the assumption that
A is a minimal weak covering set. Thus A is a minimal covering set. The same
arguments apply to minimal weighted weak covering sets. h
Since the plurality game induced by a 0-weighted tournament (X,M) has a unique
weak saddle, it has a unique minimal weak weighted covering set, which must also be
the unique minimal weighted covering set of (X,M) by Lemma 3. Thus, we may state the
following deﬁnition.P. De Donder et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 85–109 97
Deﬁnition 11. The minimal weighted covering set MC (X,M) of a 0-weighted w
tournament (X,M) is the unique weighted covering set of (X,M) that does not contain
other covering sets of (X,M).
Finally, under the additional restriction that the elements m(x,y)o fM are odd integer
for all x ±y, the plurality game has a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies. The
support of this equilibrium is another solution for 0-weighted tournaments.
Deﬁnition 12. The Weighted Bipartisan Set BP (X,M) of a 0-weighted tournament w
(X,M) is the support of the unique equilibrium in mixed strategies of the corresponding
6 plurality game.
We list the different solution sets for tournament and plurality games in Table 1.
Recall that X is a saddle for a tournament only if there is no Condorcet winner.
2.5. Three other C2 choice correspondences
We now present three C2 social choice correspondences that have been widely
discussed in the literature and that are very often used. Their transposition as solutions
for a weighted tournament will be immediate.
The ﬁrst concept is due to Kemeny (1959). Given a situation (X,P), this corre-
spondence ﬁrst chooses the linear orders that are as close as possible to P in a sense to
be made precise below and then takes the top elements of these orders as the choice set.
Given a set X and two linear orders O and O9 on X, let
2 d(O,O9);[h(x,y)[X , x ±y, xOy and yO9xj.
In words, d(O,O9) is the number of inversions in the two orders O and O9. Clearly, d is
a distance over the set of orders on X. Kemeny then deﬁnes a ‘distance’ between a linear
order O and a proﬁle P as:
d(O,P);O d(O,P ). i
P [P i
Table 1
Solution concepts for tournament and plurality games
Game Tournament Plurality
Saddle X
Weak saddle MC MCw
Mixed saddle TC TCw
Weakly undominated strategies UC UCw
Support of the unique equilibrium
in mixed strategies BP BPw
6This deﬁnition was ﬁrst proposed by Laffond et al. (1994).98 P. De Donder et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 85–109
* Deﬁnition 13. A Kemeny order for a situation (X,P) is a linear order O [
arg min d(O,P). The Kemeny set Ke(X,P) of a situation (X,P) is the set of top O[L
elements of the Kemeny orders for the situation.
The following simple and well-known lemma gives a useful characterization of the
Kemeny choice correspondence.
* Lemma 4. O is a Kemeny order for a situation (X,P) if and only if
* O [arg maxOOn (x,y). P O[Lx[Xy[X
xOy
It follows from this lemma that the Kemeny social choice correspondence is C2. This
lemma inspires the following deﬁnition for weighted tournaments.
Deﬁnition 14. A Kemeny order for a q-weighted tournament (X,N) is a linear order




The Kemeny set Ke(X,N)o faq-weighted tournament (X,N) is the set of the top elements
of the Kemeny orders for the weighted tournament.
Since
arg maxOOn (x,y)5arg maxOOm (x,y), PP O[LO [L x[Xy[Xx [Xy[X
xOy xOy
the following relation holds for all situations:
]]
Ke(X,P)5Ke(X,N )5Ke(X,M ). (1) PP
]
Since there is no risk of confusion, we shall write Ke(X,N) instead of Ke(X,N)i nt h e
remainder of the article.
The Kemeny rule has been axiomatized by Young and Levenglick (1978). Young
(1988) also provides a very nice foundation for this procedure. Suppose that there is a
true ordering O of the alternatives in X and that in any pairwise comparison, each voter
chooses the better candidate with some ﬁxed probability p (the competence parameter),
1 ] where ,p ,1 and p is the same for all voters. Assume also that every voter’s 2
judgment on every pair of candidates is independent of his judgment on every other pair
and that judgments are independent from one voter to another. Under these assumptions,
* it can be shown that O is a Kemeny order if and only if it maximizes the likelihood of
being the true order O given the pattern of pairwise votes in the proﬁle P. This is
precisely the statistical framework used by Condorcet to justify his criterion.
Slater (1961) proposes a choice correspondence for tournaments. A Slater order for a
* tournament (X,T) is an order O [arg min d(O,T). The Slater set Sl(X,T) for a O[L
tournament (X,T) is the set of top elements of the Slater orders for the tournament.
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M either 21 or 1, the Kemeny set for (X,M) and the Slater set for the tournament (X,T )
coincide. Thus, the Slater rule may be seen as the C1 counterpart of the Kemeny rule.
Simpson (1969) and Kramer (1977) propose to take the set of outcomes whose
maximal opposition is the weakest as the solution of a situation. Kramer (1977) shows
that this set is an attraction point of a sequential electoral competition between two
parties when platforms belong to some Euclidean space.
Deﬁnition 15. The Simpson–Kramer set or the minmax set SK(X,P) of a situation (X,P)
is:
SK(X,P);arg min max n (x,y) p
y[X\hxj x[X
This social choice correspondence is also C2. We can thus transpose its deﬁnition to
weighted tournaments as we did with the Kemeny rule and a relation similar to (1) holds
for the minmax sets.
The last choice correspondence to be introduced is the Borda rule, a well-known
scoring method. Given a situation (X,P), we ﬁrst deﬁne: ;P [P, ;x [X, R(x,P ); ii
[hy [X : xP yj. The Borda score of an element x [X is then deﬁned as B(x,P); i
o R(x,P ). P [Pi i
* Deﬁnition 16. A Borda winner for a situation (X,P)i sa n yx [arg max B(x,P). The x[X
Borda set Bor(X,P) of a situation (X,P) is the set of Borda winners for this situation.
The following lemma is well known.
Lemma 5. For any situation (X,P), Bor(X,P)5arg max o n (x,y). x[Xy [X/hxj P
7 Thus, the Borda correspondence is C2. As for the Kemeny rule and the Kramer–
Simpson rule, the deﬁnition of the Borda rule can be transposed to weighted tournaments
and a relation similar to (1) holds for the Borda sets.
Many justiﬁcations have been given for the Borda rule. One of them emerges from the
statistical framework of Condorcet. Suppose that instead of searching for the ‘true’
ranking of the candidates, we focus on the determination of which candidates are most
likely to be the best. Then, as pointed out by Condorcet (1785) and by Young (1988), if
1 ] the competence parameter p is sufﬁciently close to , the Borda winners turn out to be 2
the most likely best candidates. However, if p is sufﬁciently close to 1, the answer is the
Kramer–Simpson set.
Condorcet (1785) showed that the Borda choice correspondence does not always
select the Condorcet winner when it exists. The Borda rule is not the only choice
correspondence studied here not to be Condorcet consistent. The following example
shows that UC is not Condorcet consistent. Consider the 0-weighted tournament w
deﬁned by the following table:
7Lemma 5 shows that, in some sense, the Borda set is the C2 conterpart of the Copeland (1951) set for
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abcd
a 0111
b 210 5 25
c 21 250 5
d 215 250
It is easy to see that haj is the Condorcet winner and that UC (X,M)5ha,b,c,dj. All w
other solutions deﬁned in this section are Condorcet consistent.
3. Set-theoretical comparison of solution concepts
In this section, we examine the relationships between the 11 solutions for 0-weighted
tournaments introduced in the previous section. Table 2 summarizes the results of these
set-theoretical comparisons.
· A # in a cell indicates that the solution set of the corresponding row is contained in
the solution set of the corresponding column. For the BP row, the inclusion is true w
for any voting tournament with odd m(x,y) ;x ±y. For all other cells, it is true for
any 0-weighted tournament (X,M).
· A > means that for any 0-weighted tournament (X,M), the solution set of the
corresponding row intersects the solution set of the corresponding column but that
there exists a voting tournament (X,M) such that none of the solution sets of the row
or the column is a subset of the other.
· A 5 means that there exists a voting tournament (X,M) such that the intersection of
the solution sets of the row and the column is empty.
We recall that voting tournaments are 0-weighted tournaments (X,M) such that all the
off-diagonal entries of M have the same parity. By Debord’s theorem, there always
exists a voting situation underlying a voting tournament. Thus, results such as S ,S9,
Table 2
Comparison of solution concepts
TC TC UC MC BP UC MC Ke SK BP www w
TC # w
UC >> w
MC >> # w
BP ## # # w
UC # 5 #>5
MC # 5 ##5 #
Ke # 5 # 55 5 5
SK 55 >>5555
BP # 5 ##5 ##55
Bor 55 # 55 5 5 5 5 5P. De Donder et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 85–109 101
S >S 55, and S­S for some voting tournament, where S and S9 are two solution sets,
8 can be transposed to social choice correspondences.
Remark 1. The chain of inclusions BP #MC #UC#TC is well known from the
literature on tournament solutions. Fishburn (1977) shows that Ke #TC and Laffond et
al. (1994) prove that we may haveB P >BP 55. The possible empty intersection of w
Bor with TC, TC , MC , BP , UC, MC, Ke, SK, and BP follows from the fact that these ww w
nine solutions are Condorcet consistent and that a Condorcet winner may fail to be a
9 Borda winner.
The remainder of this section deals with the other entries in the table. Many of the
inclusion results may be deduced from a glance at Table 2. These deductions are left to
the reader. The two examples that follow will be used to establish some of the results.
Example 1. Consider the following voting tournament (X,M):
abcde
a 0125 231
b 210 3 231
c 5 230 3 1
d 33230 1
e 21 21 21 210
M One can check that TC(X,T )5ha,b,c,dj, TC (X,M)5hb,c,dj, UC (X,M)5hb,c,d,ej, ww
Ke(X,M)5Bor(X,M)5hcj, and SK(X,M)5hej.
Example 2. Consider the following voting tournament (X,M):
abcdef
a 0325 231 21
b 230 3 231 1
c 5 230 3 1 23
d 33230 1 3
e 21 21 21 210 21
f 1 213 231 0
MM One can check that TC(X,T )5TC (X,M)5ha,b,c,d,fj, UC(X,T )5hb,c,d,fj, w
MM UC (X,M)5hb,c,d,e,fj, MC(X,T )5BP(X,T )5BP (X,M)5hb,c,dj, MC (X,M)5 ww w
hb,c,d,ej, Ke(X,M)5Bor(X,M)5hdj, and SK(X,M)5hej.
8A#B signiﬁes that A is a subset of B with the possibility that A5B and , indicates a strict inclusion.
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3.1. The weighted top cycle (TC ) w
M Proposition 1. TC (X,M)#TC(X,T ) for any 0-weighted tournament (X,M). w
M Proof. Consider the plurality game induced by (X,M) restricted to TC(X,T ). Since the
value of this game is zero, we deduce from the minmax theorem that there exists a
M M p [D(TC(X,T )) such that o p(x)m(x,y)$0 for all y [TC(X,T ). Next take a x[TC
MM z [ ⁄ TC(X,T ). From the deﬁnition of TC(X,T ), we have m(z,y),0 for all y [
M TC(X,T ). Combining the two sets of inequalities, we deduce that z is strictly dominated
MM in the mixed sense relative to TC(X,T ). Therefore, TC(X,T ) is a MGSP and since
M TC (X,M) is the unique mixed saddle, then TC (X,M)#TC(X,T ). h ww
M Remark 2. Example 1 shows that one can haveT C(X,M),TC(X,T ). w
Proposition 2. There exists a voting tournament (X,M) such that TC (X,M)> w
MMM BP(X,T )5TC (X,M)>MC(X,T )5TC (X,M)>UC(X,T )55. ww
Proof. Consider the following voting tournament (X,M), which Laffond et al. (1994) use
to prove that we may have BP >BP 55: w
abcxyz
a 01211 291
b 210 1 1 1 29
c 1 210 291 1
x 21 219 0 5 25
y 9 21 21 250 5
z 219 215 250
MMM The reader can check that BP(X,T )5MC(X,T )5UC(X,T )5ha,b,cj and
10 BP (X,M)5TC (X,M)5hx,y,zj. h ww
3.2. The weighted uncovered set (UC ) w
It has been shown that the top cycle is a superset of the weighted top cycle. This order
of inclusion is reversed for the uncovered set.
M Proposition 3. UC(X,T )#UC (X,M) for any 0-weighted tournament (X,M). w
Proof. The proof is straightforward and left to the reader. h
10a is strictly dominated in the mixed sense relative to hx,y,zj by p(x)50, p(y)53/10, p(z)57/10.
b is strictly dominated in the mixed sense relative to hx,y,zj by p(x)57/10, p(y)50, p(z)53/10.
c is strictly dominated in the mixed sense relative to hx,y,zj by p(x)53/10, p(y)57/10, p(z)50.P. De Donder et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 85–109 103
Remark 3. Example 2 shows that there exists a voting tournament (X,M) such that
M UC(X,T ),UC (X,M). w
M Proposition 4. (a) UC (X,M)>TC(X,T )±5 for any 0-weighted tournament (X,M). w
M (b) There exists a voting tournament (X,M) such that UC (X,M)­TC(X,T ) and w
M TC(X,T )­UC (X,M). w
M Proof. (a) Ke(X,M) is a subset of both UC (X,M) and TC(X,T ) by, respectively, w
Proposition 10 below and Remark 1.
(b) This follows from Example 2. h
Proposition 5. Bor(X,M)#UC (X,M) for any 0-weighted tournament (X,M). w
Proof. If UC (X,M)5X, there is nothing to prove. Suppose UC (X,M)±X and take w w
any y [ ⁄ UC (X,M). By transitivity of C , there must exist an x [UC (X,M) such that ww w
xC y relative to X, i.e. such that m(x,y).0 and m(x,z)2m(y,z)$0 ;z ±x,y. This w
implies o m(x,z).o m(y,z) and thus y is not a Borda winner. h z[Xz [X
Remark 4. Examples 1 and 2 both show that there exists a voting tournament (X,M)
such that Bor(X,M),UC (X,M). w
3.3. The weighted minimal covering set (MC ) w
We now show that the order of inclusion between the weighted and unweighted
minimal covering sets is the same as for the uncovered set.
M Proposition 6. MC(X,T )#MC (X,M) for any 0-weighted tournament (X,M). w
Proof. From Lemma 2, we know that MC (X,M) is a weak covering set and, from w
M Lemma 3, that MC(X,T ) is the unique minimal weak covering set of (X,M). Thus,
M MC(X,T )#MC (X,M). h w
M Remark 5. Example 2 exhibits a voting tournament (X,M) such that MC(X,T ),
MC (X,M). w
]
Remark 6. By deﬁnition, MC (X,M)#UC (X,M)#UC (X,M). Combining Proposition www
M 6 with MC #UC#TC of Remark 1 yields: MC (X,M)>UC(X,T )±5 and w
M MC (X,M)>TC(X,T )±5 for any 0-weighted tournament (X,M). w
MM Remark 7. Example 2 shows that MC (X,M)­TC(X,T ) and TC(X,T )­MC (X,M). ww
MM The same example shows that MC (X,M)­UC(X,T ) and UC(X,T )­MC (X,M). ww104 P. De Donder et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 85–109
3.4. The weighted bipartisan set (BP ) w
The results of this subsection are established for voting tournaments with off-diagonal
odd entries.
Proposition 7. If (X,M) is a voting tournament with odd m(x,y) ;x ±y, then
BP (X,M)#TC (X,M) and BP (X,M)#MC (X,M). ww w w
Proof. From a result of Laffond et al. (1997), the game induced by this tournament has a
unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies and this equilibrium is symmetric.
BP (X,M) is the support of this equilibrium. Using results in Duggan and Le Breton w
(1997a), we may assert that if A 3 A is a WGSP or a MGSP, then BP (X,M)# A and 12 w 1
BP (X,M)# A . This establishes the two parts of the proposition. h w2
Remark 8. Combining Proposition 7 with MC (X,M)#UC (X,M) of Remark 6, we ww
obviously haveB P(X,M)#UC (X,M) for any voting tournament with odd m(x,y) ww
;x ±y.
Remark 9. Example 2 shows that there exists a voting tournament (X,M) such that
BP (X,M),TC (X,M) and BP (X,M),MC (X,M). ww w w
Proposition 8. (a) TC (X,M)>MC (X,M)±5 for any voting tournament (X,M) with ww
odd m(x,y) ;x ±y.
(b) There exists a voting tournament (X,M) such that TC (X,M)­MC (X,M) and ww
MC (X,M)­TC (X,M). ww
Proof. (a) By Proposition 7, both TC (X,M) and MC (X,M) contain BP (X,M). ww w
(b) This follows from Example 2. h
Remark 10. Combining Proposition 8 and MC (X,M)#UC (X,M) of Remark 6, we ww
obtain UC (X,M)>TC (X,M)±5 for any voting tournament (X,M) with odd m(x,y) ww
;x ±y. Example 2 shows that there exists a voting tournament (X,M) such that
TC (X,M)­UC (X,M) and UC (X,M)­TC (X,M). ww w w
Remark 11. The example used in the proof of Proposition 2 shows that there exists a
MM voting tournament (X,M) for which BP (X,M)>UC(X,T )5BP (X,M)>MC(X,T )5 ww
M BP (X,M)>BP(X,T )55. w
3.5. The Kemeny set (Ke)
Proposition 9. There exists a voting tournament (X,M) such that Ke(X,M)>
MMM BP(X,T )5Ke(X,M)>MC(X,T )5Ke(X,M)>UC(X,T )55.
Proof. Consider the following voting tournament:P. De Donder et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 85–109 105
abcd
a 0321 21
b 230 5 21
c 1 250 3
d 11230
M It is easy to see that UC(X,T )5hb,c,dj. Using Lemma 4, one can check that (a,b,c,d)i s
the unique Kemeny order so that Ke(X,M)5haj. Since BP #MC #UC, we have the
result. h
Proposition 10. Ke(X,M)#UC (X,M) for any 0-weighted tournament (X,M). w
Proof. We prove a stronger claim: xC (M)y ÞxOy for every Kemeny order O. Suppose w
on the contrary that there exists a Kemeny order O ;(...,y,x ,x ,x ,..., x ,x,...)a n d 123 k
consider the order O9 obtained by permuting x and y in O. Then,
kk OO m(u,v)2OOm(u,v)5O(m(x,x )2m(y,x )) 1O(m(x ,y)2m(x ,x)) ii ii
u[Ov[Oi 51 i51 u[O9v[O9
uOv uO9v
k
1m(x,y)2m(y,x)52O(m(x,x )2m(y,x )) ii
i51
1m(x,y)2m(y,x).
Since xC (M)y, the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is non negative and the last one is w
strictly positive. Therefore, by Lemma 4, O is not a Kemeny order, a contradiction. h
Remark 12. Examples 1 and 2 both show that there exists a voting tournament (X,M)
such that Ke(X,M),UC (X,M). w
Proposition 11. There exists a voting tournament (X,M) such that Ke(X,M)>
MC (X,M)5Ke(X,M)>BP (X,M)55. ww
Proof. Consider the following voting tournament (X,M), which induces the tournament
of Proposition 3.1 in Laffond et al. (1995):
abcdef gh
a 01121 211 1 1
b 210 1 21 211 1 1
c 21 21 011111
d 11210 1 21 21 21
e 1121 210 1 1 1
f 21 21 211 210 1 1
g 21 21 211 21 210 1
h 21 21 211 21 21 210106 P. De Donder et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 85–109
MM M 2 M Since Sl(X,T )5hej and MC(X,T )5BP(X,T )5UC (X,T )5ha,b,cj, it follows
from Laffond et al. (1995) that Ke(X,M)5hej and MC (X,M)5BP (X,M)5 ww
ha,c,dj. h
Proposition 12. There exists a voting tournament (X,M) such that Ke(X,M)>
TC (X,M)55. w
Proof. Consider the following voting tournament:
abcdef gh
a 09929 27 1 11 11 1
b 290 9 29 27 1 11 11 1
c 29 29 0 9 1 11 11 11 1
d 99290 9 27 27 27
e 77211 290 9 9 9
f 211 211 211 7 290 9 9
g 211 211 211 7 29 290 9
h 211 211 211 7 29 29 290
It can be checked that TC (X,M)5ha,b,c,dj and Ke(X,M)5hej. h w
3.6. The Simpson–Kramer minmax set (SK)
Proposition 13. There exists a voting tournament (X,M) such that
M SK(X,M)>BP (X,M)5SK(X,M)>TC (X,M)5SK(X,M)>BP(X,T ) ww
MM 5SK(X,M)>MC(X,T )5SK(X,M)>UC(X,T )5SK(X,M)
M >TC(X,T )5SK(X,M)>Ke(X,M)55.
Proof. This follows from Example 2 and the fact that BP #MC #UC#TC by Remark
1. h
Remark 13. Examples 1 and 2 also show that a Simpson–Kramer winner may be a
Condorcet loser, i.e. it can lose in pairwise comparisons against every other alternative.
Proposition 14. (a) SK(X,M)>MC (X,M)±5 for any 0-weighted tournament (X,M). w
(b) There exists a voting tournament (X,M) such that MC (M)­SK(M) and w
SK(X,M)­MC (M). w
Proof. (a) Suppose SK(X,M)>MC (X,M)55 and take any k [SK(X,M). Since w
k [ ⁄ MC (X,M), 'a [MC (X,M):aC (X,M)k relative to MC (X,M)<hkj, i.e. m(a,k). ww w w
0 and
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We distinguish two cases:
Case 1: 'x [MC (X,M)>arg min m(a,z). By (2), m(a,z)$m(k,z). Thus, a [ w z[X/haj
SK(X,M), a contradiction.
Case 2: MC (X,M)>arg min m(a,z)55. Take any x [arg min m(a,z). w z[X/haj z[X/haj
Since x [ ⁄ MC (X,M), 'b [MC (X,M):bC (M)x relative to MC (X,M)<hxj.We must ww w w
have m(a,x),0. Otherwise, a would be a Condorcet winner and one would have
SK(X,M)5MC (X,M)5haj. Since m(b,x).0 and m(a,k).0, we thus have b ±a and w
x ±k. From (2):
m(a,b)$m(k,b). (3)
Moreover, bC (M)x relative to MC (X,M)<hxj implies: ww
m(b,a)$m(x,a). (4)
Combining (3) and (4) yields m(a,x)52m(x,a)$2m(b,a)5m(a,b)$m(k,b). Thus,
a [SK(X,M), a contradiction.
(b) Consider the following voting tournament M:
abcd
a 01213
b 210 21 21
c 11023
d 23 130
One can easily check that SK(X,M)5ha,bj and that UC (X,M)5MC (X,M)5 ww
ha,c,dj. h
Remark 14. Combining Proposition 14 and MC #UC of Remark 6, we get ww
SK(X,M)>UC (X,M)±5 for any 0-weighted tournament (X,M). The voting tournament w
used in the proof of Proposition 14 gives UC (X,M)­SK(X,M) and w
SK(X,M)­UC (X,M). w
4. Conclusion
In this article, we have introduced three new solutions for weighted tournaments,
which are the weighted equivalents of the Top Cycle, the Uncovered set, and the
Minimal Covering set. We have also performed a comparison of 11 solution sets for
weighted and unweighted tournaments in terms of inclusion, intersection or absence of
the latter.
A ﬁrst conclusion that can be drawn from these comparisons is that the weighted
uncovered set UC is a superset of most other solution sets with three exceptions. UC w w
always intersects TC, TC , and SK without being a subset or a superset of the latter. w
UC includes the Borda winners and the Condorcet winner whenever it exists, despite w108 P. De Donder et al. / Mathematical Social Sciences 40 (2000) 85–109
the fact that it is not Condorcet consistent. Thus UC should rally both Condorcet and w
Borda advocates as being a set within which the choice of an alternative should be made.
A second conclusion that can be drawn from these comparisons is that the chain of
inclusions BP #MC #UC#TC established for tournaments is lost when we move to
weighted tournaments. We still obtain BP #MC #UC and BP #TC . However, www w w
while TC and UC always intersect, it can happen that none contains the other. The ww
same is true of MC and TC . ww
A third conclusion concerns the comparison between tournaments and weighted
tournaments. Since weighted tournaments contain more information than tournaments,
one could expect solution sets for weighted tournaments to reﬁne their tournament
counterparts. Surprisingly, this is the case only for TC. Indeed, TC #TC and, in many w
examples that we worked out, TC is much smaller than TC. But this order of inclusion w
is reversed for UC and MC while BP and BP might not even intersect. w
A ﬁnal conclusion deals with the position of Ke and SK within the family of solutions
examined in this article. Since Ke and SK are deﬁned without any reference to the
solution concepts for the game induced by a weighted tournament, we might expect the
absence of clear relations with the solution sets that have a relation with solution
concepts for games. This is conﬁrmed by our results. Except for Ke #TC, Ke #UC , w
SK >UC ±5, and SK >MC ±5, the intersection of Ke and SK with any of the other ww
solution sets may be empty.
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